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Abstract
On 11 December 2005, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that targeted killings were not strictly prohibited under international law. Analysis of the court case and supporting documents will illustrate that the position taken by the court is sound in it's legal judgment and provides the United States Military and other Government Organizations a powerful tool. Analysis of centers of gravity on the middle to lower end of the range of military operations, with regard to counterinsurgency operations specifically, will show that the center of gravity rests squarely with the local population. In combining the two, it will be shown that just because targeted killings are legal they, for the majority part, run counter to the struggle the United States wages for legitimacy in it's fight so far from home. Operational commanders have many tools in their varied operations fighting insurgencies and terrorism. This paper provides further guidance on the employment of targeted killings, resulting in operational commanders who have less ambiguity on when to employ the tactic, when not to and when to seek legal and higher echelon guidance.
INTRODUCTION
Targeted killings are an often misunderstood tactic that has been utilized by many nation's armed forces during the recent history of military operations. The killing of a specific uniformed officer of an enemy armed force is often mistaken as a targeted killing.
An example of this would be the shooting down of two Mitsubishi G4M -Betty‖ attack aircraft, one carrying ADM Isoroku Yamamoto, as they transited from Rabaul to Bougainville on April 18, 1943 killing Yamamoto and 19 members of his staff and aircrew.
1 This was not a -targeted killing.‖ This was the legitimate use of force between combatants of uniformed armed forces who were in a state of armed conflict with each other.
According to Eban Kaplan of the Council on Foreign Relations, -targeted killings are used by governments to eliminate individuals they view as a threat. Generally speaking, a nation's intelligence, security, or military forces identify the individual in question and carry out an operation intended to kill him or her.‖ 2 This civilian is targeted for killing, vice arrest and attempted trial, usually due to the fact that he is well protected, often hiding in plain clothes among the local population and knowledge of his whereabouts is highly transient in nature. It is often difficult to gain the requisite knowledge of the target's location and have enough time to mass the force required to safely apprehend the individual with acceptable risk to friendly force. Due to the transient nature of the circumstances, and in order to reduce risk to force, the subject will be targeted for killing (often through the use of substantial air delivered ordnance). As the individual is often hiding amongst the local population, collateral damage is inflicted when innocent bystanders are injured or killed as a result of the Operational commanders must put a targeted killing course of action under strict scrutiny and weigh the benefit of reducing risk to force against the potential risk to mission. This paper argues that whenever possible individuals should be arrested and put on trial, either by an established independent court system or a military court. Ultimately, due to the legitimacy ramifications and risk to mission at the national strategic level, if a targeted killing is the preferred course of action it should pass a strict test or be vetted through higher command. feasible, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, the subject should be arrested, a case prepared and a trial held.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Continuing in the context of LOAC, we must also examine the requirement of -for such time as.‖ The civilian can only be targeted -for such time as‖ he is taking the aforementioned -direct part.‖ Much like the grey area of the previous discussion, there is room for interpretation of -for such time as.‖ Is the civilian only able to be targeted at the specific moment that he is triggering the IED, or is a wider timeframe legally viable? Barak explains the view of the Israeli Supreme Court stating: -the rest between hostilities is nothing other than preparation for the next hostility.‖ 13 Again in the eyes of the court, the insurgent is able to be targeted not just at the specific time that he is performing the act of hostility, but over a wider time as well. the subject. In addition to it's ruling, the court sets important limits which merit discussion as well. Ultimately the court rules that -it cannot be determined in advance that every targeted killing is prohibited according to customary international law, just as it cannot be determined in advance that every targeted killing is permissible according to customary international law… the legality of each individual such act must be determined in light of it.‖ 14 The court set limits by stating that a targeted killing's -harm to nearby innocent civilians might be greater than that caused by refraining from it. In that state of affairs, it
should not be used… if the harm is not only to a civilian directly participating in the hostilities, rather also to innocent civilians nearby, the harm to them is collateral damage. Traditionally this is done through the Central Intelligence Agency, but any government asset can be used and a specific -lethal‖ Presidential Finding can be issued explicitly authorizing the use of force. The Presidential Finding is the key point. The ramifications throughout the international community at the National Strategic level are so great that the order to execute an operation in the territory of another sovereign state must come directly from the top.
COIN CENTER OF GRAVITY: THE LOCAL POPULATION
A central tool the operational commander uses in designing an operation within a conflict at any point on the ROMO is analysis of the Center of Gravity, or COG. Dr. Joe
Strange of the United States Marine Corps War College defines a COG as -a strength, either moral or physical, and a dynamic and powerful agent in its own right.‖ 21 For example, in conflicts on the right side of the ROMO, COGs are usually major combat forces that can take and hold territory and force their will upon the enemy. Through operational level analysis and operational art, planners can identify an enemy COG, assess its capabilities, requirements and vulnerabilities, enabling them to design a scheme to defeat the COG and bring the conflict to the commander's desired endstate.
In the protracted conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for center-left of the ROMO operations in general, there is no major combat force. It can be argued that the local population who harbor and assist, or at a minimum tolerate, the insurgents blending in amongst them, holds this moral force, or COG. If the local population can be convinced that it is in their interest to take an active part in exposing those insurgents, they can be successfully exposed, removed from the population and peace and stability can continue to be established. This position is supported by doctrine, specifically the draft Joint Publication normally is isolation of the insurgents from the population, and this isolation is maintained by, with, and through the population-not forced upon the population.‖ 22 Operational commanders must constantly strive to develop schemes that properly account for the Center of Gravity and mitigate any risks a single operation might have on the endstate goals.
OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS
In planning operations the commander must weigh many issues. Central to the current discussion in regards to targeted killings are the principles of proportionality, restraint and legitimacy. Under the idea of jus in bello, or justice in war, proportionality, the Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains, -requires tempering the extent and violence of warfare to minimize destruction and casualties. It is broadly utilitarian in that it seeks to minimize overall suffering, but it can also be understood from other moral perspectives, for instance, from harboring good will to all (Kantian ethics).‖ 23 This desire to mitigate impact on the civilian population is integral to the mission of the United Nations, where member nations strive -to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, should be brought to bear and the subject should be arrested and tried. This is no easy task and there is no assumption that it will be. Against an enemy who hides amongst the population, knowledge of his whereabouts is often fleeting. On the high moral ground Americans believe they occupy, many things aren't easy. So not only is the killing of women and children philosophically and morally questionable in Islamic tradition, but forbidden by Sacred Law. We can see that the viewpoint of the local population could be significantly affected by their religious convictions when assessing the validity of an air strike and its collateral damage in the form of civilian casualties.
The position of this paper is not to say that targeted killings should not be employed at all. In rare circumstances it may be preferred to kill a subject vice give him an audience at a trial, or if he is so well protected or harbored in such strongly held enemy terrain that capture is unfeasible. Barak explicitly states: -arrest investigation, and trial are not means which can always be used. At times it involves a risk so great to the lives of the soldiers, that it is not required… However it is a possibility which should always be considered.‖ this COA that the commander must weigh. In an operation to arrest an unprivileged belligerent, risk to force at the tactical level is significant and by specifically removing a tool from the commander's toolbox, the insurgents gain a tactical advantage of knowing he will not be targeted if hiding amongst the population and the offensive could potentially be lost.
CONCLUSION
By taking a synergistic approach the operational commander can achieve desired tactical results while also achieving the theater-strategic objective of establishing a selfruling government contributing international peace and cooperation. For the majority of cases operational commanders should strive to detain subjects, build a case in either local independent courts (preferably) or a military court, and put them on trial. This is no easy task, but supports the goals of legitimacy, restraint and proportionality. Counterinsurgency is on the spectrum of armed conflict and as such legally, through precedent set by the Israeli Supreme Court and liberal interpretation of LOAC, it can be argued that operational commanders have the ability to order a targeted killing. The view from outside may differ and operational commanders must exercise a strict test on every targeted killing course of action, weighing the benefit of the tactical objective and decreased risk to force against the potential increase in risk to mission brought on by negative repercussions within the local populace (the COG). He must be able to show beyond a doubt why the subject was targeted and why it was unfeasible to arrest and try him. He must be confident that, had the time required been available, a Presidential Finding would have been issued. In order to ensure that the intent is being upheld, targeted killings should be examined thoroughly after the fact.
The Israeli Supreme court supports this point when it says -after an attack on a civilian suspected on taking an active part, at such time, in hostilities, a thorough investigation regarding the precision of the identification of the target and the circumstances of the attack upon him is to be performed.‖ 38 If there is any question in regards to the legality or consequences of such an order, potential risk to mission is too great and Judge Advocate and higher-level guidance should be sought, up to and including a Presidential Finding itself. To sum it up in a single sentence: Just because you can, doesn't mean you should.
